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Abstract: Nigeria’s spending of US$2billion annually on rice importation has been considered a major source 
of foreign exchange drain and a threat to domestic rice industry. One of the major reasons adduced for this 
high import bills is the persistent demand-supply gap arising from the country’s inability to increase 
domestic output of paddy rice to optimize the total capacity of several integrated rice mills established across 
the country in the last 15 years. In 2015, the government launched the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) 
to make cheap funds accessible to smallholder farmers (SHFs) who produce more than 85% of total farm 
output in Nigeria. ABP is designed to encourage banks to lend to SHFs to boost paddy rice production. This 
paper presents the field experiences of SHFs, banks and rice millers who participated in the programme in 
2016/2017. This paper concludes that ABP is a laudable programme that can contribute in achieving the food 
security objective of the government. The key challenges found to be threatening the success and 
sustainability of ABP included delays in timely disbursement of funds by deposit money banks (DMBs), 
inadequate personnel and institutional framework, side-selling of harvested paddy rice by SHFs, State 
government undue involvement in the ABP, and poor rural infrastructure. Policy recommendations to 
strengthen the ABP model for improved impact were discussed.  
 
Keywords: Anchor Borrowers’ Programme, Smallholder farmers, Anchor, Central Bank of Nigeria, Deposit 
Money Banks, Nigeria 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Rice (oryza sativa) is a major staple food in Nigeria; its consumption has no cultural, religious, ethnic or 
geographical boundary (Isa et al., 2013). According to Johnson et al. (2013), the commodity ranks first among 
all staple food items in terms of expenditures and second only to cassava in terms of quantity consumed. 
Considering the country’s large population of over 170million people, high per capita annual consumption of 
40kg (USDA, 2016) and general acceptability of rice, Nigeria is the largest consumer of rice in Africa. The 
country’s estimated average annual demand for milled rice is 5.2 million tons, while the average national 
production of paddy is 3.8 million tons. Given the country’s rice processing capacity and average recovery 
ratio of 62% (Ogunfowora, 2007), an annual average of 2.4 million tons of milled rice is produced 
domestically (USDA, 2016). This gives an average annual demand-supply gap of 1.9million tons of milled rice. 
To bridge this gap, milled rice worth US$2billion is being imported annually into the country (Ayanwale and 
Amusan, 2012) and this has made Nigeria the largest importer of rice in Africa (FAO, 2012).  
 
Nigeria’s dependency on rice imports is a huge drain on the country’s foreign currency reserves, increases 
her vulnerability to global price shocks, threatens the growth of domestic rice industry and raises overall 
concerns about the country’s food insecurity. Consequently, the country, like many other countries, has 
adopted the import substitution strategy by introducing various initiatives and programmes designed to 
promote domestic rice production to achieve self-sufficiency through import restrictions and investments to 
improve product output and quality. The total annual demand for rice in Nigeria has been consistently 
declining since 2013 (Table 1). This is largely due to declining consumer purchasing power and rising market 
prices; both caused by current price inflation and currency devaluation. Output of milled rice has remained 
stable at an average of 2.7million tons per annum while import has declined mainly due to stringent import 
restriction policy measures imposed by the government and scarcity of foreign exchange. Despite declining 
consumption and imports, the demand-supply gap has remained stable at an average of 2.5million tons per 
annum. Opeyemi et al. (2015) found that non-availability in the market all year round is one of the major 
factors that affect the demand for locally milled rice in Nigeria. Thus, the only way Nigeria can attain self-
sufficiency in rice production is to achieve average paddy output of at least 8.4million tons per annum, which 
is more than twice the current average annual paddy production in Nigeria. This requires the expansion of 
current cultivable land of 2.3million hectares and an increasing current average yield of 1.56tons per hectare 
(USDA, 2016).  
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Table 1: Trends of Nigeria's Milled Rice Demand, Supply and Import ('000 Mt) 2000 - 2016 
Year Demand Supply (paddy) Supply (milled) Import Demand-Supply Gap 
2000 3029 3298 1979 1250 1050 
2001 3051 2752 1651 1906 1400 
2002 3307 2928 1757 1897 1550 
2003 3670 3117 1870 1448 1800 
2004 3750 3333 2000 1369 1750 
2005 3800 3567 2140 1650 1660 
2006 4040 4041 2546 1500 1494 
2007 4100 3187 2008 1800 2092 
2008 4220 4178 2632 1750 1588 
2009 4350 3546 2234 1750 2116 
2010 4800 4473 2818 2400 1982 
2011 5600 4567 2877 3200 2723 
2012 5300 3762 2370 2800 2930 
2013 5500 4400 2772 2800 2728 
2014 5400 4500 2835 2600 2565 
2015 5200 4300 2709 2100 2491 
2016 5000 4286 2700 2000 2300 
 Source: USDA, 2016. 
 
In the last four decades, small-scale mills have been very active; representing more than 60-70% of Nigeria’s 
total milling capacity and producing at a milling rate of 55-60%. However, their final products tend to be of 
lower quality because of limited equipment (USDA, 2016). Poor quality of locally milled rice has been 
identified as one of the major reasons for high import volume, as consumers prefer imported rice to local rice 
(Adeyeye et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2013). To reverse this situation, the government and private sector have 
since 2010 invested a total of over $1.7Billion in the establishment of more than 43 medium to large scale 
modern integrated rice mills (IRMs) (Anchors) with a total milling capacity of over 2.3million metric tons per 
annum (Tables 2 and 3). Locally milled rice brands being produced by IRMs have been found to be 
comparable to imported rice brands in terms of high quality and packaging such that consumers are 
indifferent between local and imported rice on the basis of physical quality attributes (Alfred and Adekayode, 
2014). Previous consumer-preference studies have shown that there is still an overall acknowledgement of 
higher organoleptic attributes such as taste, aroma and freshness which consumers prefer in favour local rice, 
but it is not the most decisive attribute in many cases ((Lançon et al., 2003; Tetteh et al., 2011; Demont et al., 
2012). This implies that consumers’ purchase of IRM-milled rice brands is based mostly on their availability 
and price. But, there are evidences that more than 70% of the IRMs are operating below 30% capacity due to 
the inadequate domestic supply of paddy (USDA, 2016). 
 
Table 2: List of Functioning Integrated Rice Mills (IRMS) (Anchors) in Nigeria 
S/N Name and Location Capacity 
(tons/annum) 
Investment Level 
($US million) 
1 Onyx Rice Mills Bida, Niger State 12,000 NA 
2 Olam Nigeria Ltd, Doma LGA, Nasarawa State 105,000 120 
3 JICA/FMARD/Nasarawa State ADP Incubation Rice Mill, Lafia 4,000 0.8 
4 Conti Agro (Eko Rice Mill), Imota, Ikorodu, Lagos 13,200 5 
5 Popular Foods Ltd, Lagos 210,000 22.5 
6 Popular Foods and Mills Ltd, Kano 150,000 23.4 
7 Mikap Nigeria Ltd, Makurdi 60,000 5 
8 Al Umalau Nigeria Enterprise Ltd Jaling, Taraba State 9,000 3.5 
9 Quarra Rice Mill, Tsaragi, Kwara State 24,000 NA 
10 Gouria Rice Mill Ltd, Bauchi 5,000 0.75 
11 Danmodi Food Processing Nig. Ltd, Jigawa State 12,000 1 
12 Umza Rice Mill, Kano 75,000 10 
13 Tara Agro Industry Ltd, Adani, Enugu State 42,000 12 
14 Integrated Grains Processor Nig. Ltd, Enugu 12,000 0.5 
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15 Stine Industries Ltd, Amichi, Anambra State 132,000 40 
16 Ebony Agro Industry Ltd, Ebonyi State 30,000 7 
17 Modern Rice Mill, Ikwo, Ebonyi State 12,000 NA 
18 Modern Rice Mill, Iboko, Ebonyi State 12,000 NA 
19 Modern Rice Mill, Oso-Edda, Ebonyi State 12,000 NA 
20 Labana Rice Mill, Kebbi State 100,000 36 
 TOTAL 1,031,200 287.6 
Source: CARD, 2015.  
Note: IRMs with a capacity of less than 3,000 tons per annum were not included the Table 2. 
 
Domestic paddy production in Nigeria is dominated by smallholder farmers (SHFs) who cultivate 1-2 
hectares of farmland but account for more than 80% of the total paddy rice production, while large-scale 
commercial farms with mechanization account for only less than 10% of cultivated areas and less than 20% 
of total production (FFI, 2016; GrowAfrica, n.d.). There are various programmes the government initiated in 
the past such as the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS), Rural Financing (RUFIN), etc. aimed at 
assisting SHFs access credit from the formal sector. However, these programmes have not made expected 
impact in increasing farm output due to unwillingness of financial institutions in Nigeria especially the DMBs 
to fully participate (Adegbite, 2009). DMBs perceive lending to SHFs as high risk because their farming 
business is unstructured due to poor functioning of value chains (Augustine et al., 2013), relatively long 
gestation, seasonal and exposed to unpredictable weather conditions (Philip et al., 2009; IFC, 2012). The 
transaction cost of lending to SHF is high because individual loan amount is often small due low volume of 
business, and when cooperatives are involved, the SHFs are often many, residing in remote rural locations, 
and are distantly dispersed thereby making monitoring by DMBs more difficult (Okello, 2012). In addition to 
the high risk and transaction costs, SHFs cannot afford the type of collateral acceptable to DMBs to secure any 
credit extended to them (Okojie et al., 2010). These explain the reasons why in the last 10 years, DMB’s 
lending to agriculture as a percentage of total lending in the economy has been below 5% (CBN, 2017). 
 
Table 3: List of Newly Completed or Expanded Integrated Rice Mills 
S/N Name and Location Installed 
Capacity 
(MT/Annum) 
Investment 
Level 
($million) 
1   Klysat Foods & Beverage Ltd, Hadejia, Jigawa State 52,000 3.4 
2 3-Brothers Rice Mill, Hadeja, Jigawa State  
 
30,000 10 
3 Masco Agro Allied Ind. Ltd, Makurdi, Benue  
 
70,000 2.2 
4 Masco Agro Allied Ind. Ltd, Makurdi, Benue (Expansion Planned)  
 
190,000 57 
5 Popular Farms & Mills Ltd, Kano Expansion Planned  
 
360,000 108 
6 2nd Line Conti Agro (Eko Rice Mill), Lagos Expansion Planned  
 
52,800 30 
7 Dangote Rice Mills  
 
NA 1,000 
8 Pearl Universal Impex Ltd, Bida, Niger State  
 
144,000 53 
9 Elephant Group Ltd/Veetee Rice Mill, Ofada Ogun State.  
 
75,000 35 
10 FMARD Approved Rice Mill Allocated to Elephant Group Ltd, Niger State 
 
36,000 10 
11 Elephant Grp Ltd Rice Mill (Product of Satake of Netherland), In Kebbi State. 
 
54,000 55 
12 Wacot Rice Mill, Lailaba Arugungu, Kebbi State  
 
100,000 20 
13 Pemo Farms Ltd, Aviele, Auchi LGA, Edo State  
 
30,000 9.3 
 TOTAL 1,193,800 1,393 
Source: CARD, 2015 
 
Studies have confirmed that smallholders’ access to credit increases farm production efficiency and 
productivity leading to an increased output, income and food security (Reyes et al., 2012; Nouman et al., 
2013). To boost domestic paddy rice production, the Nigerian government launched the anchor borrowers’ 
programme (ABP) in November 2015. ABP is designed to provide cheap and partially-secured loans to 
smallholder farmers (SHFs). This is to make lending attractive to DMBs and agricultural loans accessible and 
cheaper to SHFs. Despite the importance of ABP in supporting smallholder farmers to access credit, empirical 
evidence arising from field experiences, which would guide agricultural policy makers and development 
practitioners in their efforts to fine-tune the ABP guidelines to make the programme more successful and 
sustainable, is still sparse.  
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2. Objectives of the Study and Research Methodology 
 
The main objective of this paper is to help SHFs, who are an important segment of Nigeria’s population, to 
benefit from opportunities offered by the ABP. Specifically, this paper aims at: Assessing the impact of ABP in 
boosting paddy rice production in Nigeria; Describing the challenges threatening the success and 
sustainability of ABP; Identifying strategic policies for enhancing the effectiveness of ABP guidelines through 
the functional synergies of all the participants in the programme. This study was conducted in 2017 through 
purposive sampling of the rice millers (Anchors) and DMBs who participated in the 2015/2016 and 
2016/2017 ABP across the major rice producing States in Nigeria, including Kebbi, Benue, Kaduna, Niger, 
Taraba, Enugu, Cross River and Ebonyi. Primary data collection was through focus group discussion with 
farmers’ aggregators, DMBs, and rice millers (anchors) who participated in the programme in 2015/2016 and 
2016/2017 rice farming season. Data were collected by the participatory approach in which representatives 
of Anchors and DMBs shared their field experiences on the challenges, opportunities, prospects and the 
lessons learnt against the existing provisions of ABP guidelines. Secondary data, including the ABP guidelines, 
was obtained from the Development Finance Department of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). In addition, 
secondary data were obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Coalition for 
African Rice Development (CARD). Data were analysed using descriptive statistics. 
 
An Overview of the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) Model in Nigeria: The Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) in line with its developmental function established the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) to create 
a linkage between anchor companies involved in the processing and smallholder farmers (SHFs) of the 
required key agricultural commodities especially rice, wheat and sugar. ABP is funded with the N220 billion 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund (MSMEDF) of CBN through the deposit money 
banks (DMBs) at a cost of 2% and maximum interest rate of 9% to SHFs and tenor equivalent to be the 
gestation period of the identified commodities (CBN, 2016). The implementation of ABP is primarily 
supervised by the development finance office (DFO) in the Development Finance Department (DFD) of CBN in 
the various States across Nigeria. The main thrust of ABP is to provide conditions that make it attractive for 
DMBs to lend to SHFs. This involves ensuring: (1) cheaper credit; (2) timely and reliable supplies of farm 
inputs; (3) improved the capacity of SHFs through training on modern farming methods and practices; (4) 
guaranteed market for farm produce; and (5) provision of partial-collateral. The ABP model helps to structure 
the agricultural value chain to minimize the credit risk DMBs face when lending to SHFs. ABP is targeted at 
boosting production of key agro-enterprise (wheat, sugar, rice, maize, fish, cotton, etc.), stabilize inputs 
supplies to SHFs and agro-processors (Anchors) and address the country’s negative balance of payments on 
food. At harvest, the SHF supplies his/her produce to the agro-processor (Anchor) who pays the cash 
equivalent to the farmer’s account. 
 
Objectives of ABP: According to CBN (2016), the broad objective of the ABP is to create an economic linkage 
between smallholder farmers and reputable large-scale processors with a view to increasing agricultural 
output and significantly improving capacity utilization of processors. Other objectives include: Increase 
banks’ financing to the agricultural sector. Reduce agricultural commodity importation and conserve external 
reserves. Increase capacity utilization of agricultural firms creates a new generation of 
farmers/entrepreneurs and employment deepen the cashless policy and financial inclusion. Reduce the level 
of poverty among smallholder farmers assist rural smallholder farmers to grow from subsistence to 
commercial production levels.  
 
Implementation of ABP Model: The implementation of ABP is coordinated by a project management Team 
(PMT) comprising of the representative of all the stakeholders including the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), representatives of smallholder farmers (SHFs), Agricultural Development 
Programme (ADP), Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation (NAIC) under the chairmanship of the CBN 
representative (Head of Development finance officer, DFO). The implementation of the ABP is a collective 
responsibility of all the stakeholders involved. The ABP guideline prepared by CBN has clearly spelt out the 
various infractions and sanctions (CBN, 2016). Figure 1 shows the process flow of implementation activities 
under the ABP model. It was difficult for DMBs to conduct KYC (know-your-customer) and due diligence of 
the SHFs as the authenticity, accuracy and reliability of their bio and farm data, as submitted by their 
respective anchors, associations, ADPs, etc., could not be verified. This led to the emergence of many part-
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time farmers who took advantage of the cheap ADP funding and the credit risk guarantee provided under the 
ABP. It was observed that majority of these set of part-time farmers had limited time attending to their field 
crops. 
 
Figure 1: Anchor Borrowers’ Program (ABP) Process Flow Chart 
 
Source: CBN (2016) 
 
SHF Eligibility and Acceptable Collaterals: Smallholder farmers (SHF) must be a registered member of a 
recognized cooperative group who holds between 1-5 hectares of farmland and can provide at least 5% of the 
loan amount he/she requires. Such a farmer is issued a certificate after undergoing mandatory training 
covering farming as a business, improved agricultural practices and group management dynamics. 
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Certificates issued at the end of the training constitute a requirement for farmers to access credit facility in-
kind and cash under the ABP. The cost of such training is borne by the participating anchor and/or State 
government. According to the ABP guideline (CBN, 2016), funds disbursed by DMBs under the ABP are 
secured by: (a) tripartite agreement signed by SHFs, DMBs and Anchor; (b) cross and several guarantees by 
farmers in cooperatives registered on the National Collateral Registry (NCR); (c) SHFs’ equity contribution of 
at least 5% of loan amount; (d) CBN credit risk guarantee (CRG) of 50%; and NAIC insurance cover. 
 
Risks and Mitigating Measures: The various risks envisaged in the ABP as well as the measures put in place 
to mitigate such risks have been outlined in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Risks and Mitigants in ABP 
Risks Mitigants 
Poor farming techniques/low crop yield Comprehensive farmer education/technical assistance  
Credit officers not skilled in agric financing  Value chain finance training for bankers  
Effective monitoring of the process/project  PMT comprising all stakeholders will be put in place  
Farmers have no stake in the programme  Equity contribution of 5% - 10% in place  
No market for products  Off-takers in place with MOUs executed  
Price variation  Guaranteed minimum Price by FMARD in place  
Loss of crops due to natural incidences  NAIC Agric Insurance is compulsory  
Poor quality/fake inputs leading to low yields  PMT selects recognised agro-dealers  
Diversion of funds by farmers  Direct disbursement to agro-dealers  
Default by farmers/Side selling 
 
 
SHFs are to be selected by the miller. Cross and joint 
guarantees by all members of the cooperative. Miller approves 
all disbursement requests by farmers. Use of extension 
workers  
Source: CBN, 2016 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
Impact of ABP Funding on Boosting Nigeria’s Rice Output: ABP was launched by the Federal Government 
on 17th November 2015 in Kebbi State, North-west Nigeria. About 70,000 farmers benefitted from the pilot 
phase (2015/2016 dry season farming). According to a report by the CBN, as at February 2017, about 
₦29billion ($US83million*) had been disbursed to over 125,963 smallholder farmers (SHFs) in 10 States who 
cultivated a total of 160,083 hectares at an average of 1.2 hectares per farmer through 31 anchors (CBN, 
2017). This implies that the ABP has so far added about 1,207,090 tons of paddy rice into the economy. There 
are additional 24 States that have submitted an expression of interest to CBN to key into the programme for 
2017/2018 rice farming season. Under the ABP, the average productivity has increased from 3.5 tons per 
hectare to 5 tons per hectare because of quality inputs and best agronomic practices (CBN, 2017). This 
indicates a tremendous improvement in the average yield of paddy rice in Nigeria under the ABP given that 
previous statistics have shown a yield of between 1.5 to 3 tons per hectare (Johnson et al., 2013). Studies 
support the hypothesis that access to credit increases the productivity and profit of smallholder farmers 
(Hazarika and Alwang; 2003; Foltz, 2004). 
 
Table 5: Performance of ABP in 2015/2016 Dry Season and 2016 Wet Season for Rice 
 2015/2016 Dry season 2016 Wet season 
No of SHF beneficiaries 73,941 125,963 
No of hectares 81,335 160,083 
No of Anchors 2 31 
Total output of paddy 406,675 800,415 
Source: CBN, 2017 
 
                                                          
* $US1 = N350 
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Key Challenges Threatening the Success and Sustainability of ABP in Nigeria: DMBs’ long checklist of 
documentary requirements; complex bureaucracy in loan processing; and SHFs’ inability to make 5% equity 
contributions were found to be the major sources of delays in timely disbursement of funds by DMBs. 
Previous studies have confirmed that these factors hinder SHFs’ access to credit and repayment capacity 
(Okorie, 1986; Agnet, 2004; Nmadu et al., 2013). Inadequate personnel and institutional arrangements were 
found to have hampered the effective implementation of ABP at the rural level such as selection of farmers, 
verification of farms, effective monitoring, supervision and reporting of farm activities. This finding is 
supported Evbuomwan and Okoye (2017), who found a dearth of extension agents as one of the 
implementation challenges of ABP in Nigeria. This contributed to inefficient coordination of logistics among 
the key participants and implementers of the programme including the PMT, DMBs, and Anchors leading to 
late supply/distribution of inputs to farmers, extension services provision and aggregation and supply of 
harvested paddy rice to anchors. 
 
Had more challenges in repaying the loans and constituted the largest percentage of SHFs who defaulted in 
loan repayment and recovery by DMBs. Coker et al. (2018) observed a lack of updated database as one of the 
major issues militating against the effective implementation of the ABP. Side-selling of harvested farm 
produce by SHFs was one of the major challenges found to be a threat to the success of ABP. The guideline of 
ABP clearly stipulated that SHFs should sell their harvested farm produce to the Anchor in line with the 
executed tripartite memorandum of understanding (MOU). Majority of the SHFs gave various reason for side-
selling, which included: (1) settlement of debt from other lenders due to late disbursement of ABP funds; (2) 
obtaining higher market prices being offered by Anchors that were not participating in the ABP; (3) 
withholding of sales at the harvest period in order to take advantage of increased market price during the off-
season; and (4) expression of their dissatisfaction for non-receipt of ABP fund on time. Previous studies 
identified other reasons for side-selling such as government interference, weak institutional linkages, lack of 
trust among the value chain actors (SHFs, Anchors, DMBs, etc.), poverty, etc. (Coker et al., 2018; Evbuomwan 
and Okoye, 2017; Grow Africa, n.d.).  
 
It is mandatory for SHFs to take up insurance cover for their field crops. There were several incidences of 
farm destructions by flood, drought, fire and nomadic herdsmen. The insurance cover provided by Nigeria 
Agricultural Insurance Company (NAIC) does not protect field crops against grazing. Besides, there was a 
poor channel of communication which made it difficult for farmers to report to NAIC within 24 hours as 
required. Hence, farmers experienced some difficulties in getting insurance compensation from NAIC. State 
government participated in the mainstream of ABP programme by providing the equity contribution and 
extension services for SHFs as stipulated in the ABP guideline. However, it was observed that government 
involvement in the programme created a wrong impression to SHFs who see the loan as a grant from the 
government. This confirms the findings of previous studies that many SHFs were insensitive, resolute and 
unresponsive in repaying loans because the majority of the SHFs erroneously believed that the loan is from 
the government.  
 
Hence, a grant that is not supposed to be repaid (Oladeebo, 2008; CBN, 2005; Ben-Yami, n.d.). This attitude of 
SHFs largely contributed to the low repayment of ABP loans. Most smallholder farms are in remote rural 
areas of Nigeria where infrastructure such as good roads, bridges, telecommunication, etc. and security are 
grossly inadequate. These contribute to hamper the Anchors and DMBs in moving cash for on-farm payments 
to SHFs who often preferred and insisted on cash receipt of payment for paddy rice sold to the Anchor. It was 
observed that high cost of transportation and the stress of travelling a long distance on bad roads 
discouraged the majority of these SHFs from going to the DMBs in the urban areas to receive payments for 
paddy rice sold to the Anchor. This finding is corroborated by Bamiduro and Rotimi (2011) who observed 
that high cost of transportation was the major problem faced by SHFs in the marketing of their agricultural 
products in Nigeria. 
 
Key Lessons from the 2015 - 2017 ABP: Field experience of DMBs indicated that farmers in the more 
remote rural areas easily repaid their loans more than those in the Urban and semi-urban areas. Farmers in 
urban and semi-urban areas were mostly civil servants who are already indebted to other lenders.  There was 
higher loan recovery from farmers who owned just one hectare of farmland than those who owned more than 
one hectare. This agrees with the findings of Oke et al. (2007) and Kohansal and Manosoori (2009) who in 
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their separate studies identified loan size as one of the factors that determine repayment. In addition, the 
majority of farmers who easily paid their 5% equity contribution had their loans easily repaid.  
 
4. Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
ABP is a laudable programme capable of boosting SHFs productivities and making Nigeria self-sufficient in 
rice production as it is specifically targeted at smallholder farmers (SHFs) who cultivate less than 5 hectares. 
Based on the challenges observed and key lessons learnt, the following recommendations are made to 
strengthen the ABP towards achieving its objectives. There is a need for a simplified and standardized 
procedure for processing loan request under the ABP. Given the remote residence location and literacy level 
of an average SHF, it is imperative for DMBs to design a single package loan application and appraisal form 
that must capture all the requirements expected from the SHFs such as MOU, cross guarantees, acceptance of 
the offer, etc. Also, DMBs need to develop and approve well in advance, an enterprise-specific product paper 
for financing rice farming under the ABP to avoid the long bureaucracy of obtaining approvals before the loan 
can be disbursed. This ensures timeliness in loan approval and disbursement. 
 
There is a need for a well-articulated institutional framework to drive the ABP in the rural areas enhance 
extension services and provide real-time feedback to DMBs, NAIC, Anchor and CBN. An institutional 
framework for financing SHFs has been proposed for ABP (Appendix A). This framework will help to 
effectively synergize and integrate the roles of government agencies, DMBs, traditional institutions and 
agency banking in driving formal lending, financial inclusion banking and extension services delivery to SHFs 
in rural areas. It can provide a guide towards effective implementation of ABP model in Nigeria through a 
public-private-based partnership. As earlier observed by Augustine et al. (2013), a public-private-based 
partnership (PPP) linkage programme can effectively improve the functioning of agricultural value chains, 
and ABP is such a programme that can enhance the functioning of the rice value chain in Nigeria. DMBs need 
to work closely with Anchors who aggregate these SHFs for obtaining reliable data of their bios and farms for 
accurate KYCs and other information required for effective financial planning. There are several ways to stem 
side-selling by SHFs. Timely loan disbursement is key. There is a need to integrate into the ABP model, a 
robust mechanism and system of incentivising SHFs who sold to the Anchor. Loan repayment is automatic if 
the harvested paddy rice is sold to the Anchor. Transparency in the negotiation and agreement of selling price 
between the SHFs and Anchor is important Paglietti and Sabrie (2013).  
 
Punitive measures and sanctions should be given to SHFs who default in loan repayment. These may include 
blacklisting of the farmers involved (using their BVNs), enforcement of loan recovery using the law 
enforcement agents, etc. There is a need for collaboration between CBN and DMBs to strengthen agency 
banking programme to facilitate payment of paddy in rural areas. The agency banking platform needs to be 
complemented with the establishment of paddy rice aggregation and procurement centres in rural areas 
where there are clusters of rice farmers. Each centre must be equipped with a weighing machine and the 
entire paddy harvested within the cluster farms are taken and weighed at the nearest procurement centre. 
NAIC insurance cover needs to be reviewed to include the destruction of farms by grazing animals. Other 
mechanisms such as farm residence, use of inedible plants for fencing, etc. need to be put in place for 
improved security of smallholder farms. There is a need for minimal involvement of State government in the 
ABP. The roles of the State government should be restricted to the provision of rural infrastructure (feeder 
roads, culverts, bridges, dams, etc.), security, extension services, and the establishment of a mobile court to 
try farmers who have defaulted in loan repayment. DMBs and Anchors need to develop an effective 
enlightenment programme to educate SHFs that the ABP loan is neither government largess nor a grant. CBN 
activities need to be restricted more to loan administration and supervision with minimal direct interactions 
with SHFs who often perceive ABP loans as a grant on sighting CBN staffs whom they perceive as government 
officials.  
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Appendix A 
 
FMARD/SMARD 
& Agencies & 
National & 
International 
Organizations 
CBN & Agencies 
BANKS 
Head, Agric 
Finance 
STARS 
SMART 
FAC  
(Farmers 
Agribusiness 
Cooperatives) 
Farmer 
Traditional 
Ruler at diff 
levels 
Agent 
Banker 
Extension 
Agents (EAs) 
of agric 
ministries, 
ADP, NGOs, 
Orgs, etc. 
FAC 
National 
Asso./Union 
SNAPPS 
SCAFS 
Proposed IFFARM: Institutional Framework of Financing Agriculture for Rural Microfarmers 
 Develops State/National Agric Policies, Programs and 
Schemes (SNAPPS). Provides Agribusiness 
Intervention & Development (AID) funds, credit risk 
guarantees (CRGs). 
 CBN & FMARD in collaboration with Bankers committee 
develops State-level Commercial Agric Finance Schemes 
(SCAFS) for commercial banks to implement. Administers 
the LAID funds and CRGs 
 Agric Finance Unit in collaboration with Risk 
Management Unit designs the Enterprise-Specific Agric 
Product Paper (ESAPP) for the implementation of 
SCAFS. Administers the disbursement of LAID and CRGs 
to Farmers. 
State-level Technical and Agricredit Risk-management Staff 
(STARS) is a staff of the bank who is well trained to gain 
sound knowledge of soil, crop and agricredit risk 
management sciences. He/she must train SMART, does 
technical, credit risk and financial appraisal of farms and loan 
requests; can represent the head of agric finance and works 
with MDAs and organizations at SLIF meetings and activities. 
Sales and Monitoring Agents in Rural 
Territories (SMART) is employed by the bank 
and must reside in the rural area close to the 
farm clusters. He/she receives trainings from 
STARS on soil, crop and agricredit risk 
management. He/she is responsible for farm 
inspection and reporting, rural-level marketing 
of bank’s agric finance products, strict 
monitoring of farm activities (including input 
delivery and harvesting) and ensuring full 
implementation in line with transaction 
dynamics. He/she must be fully engaged in 
farming activities to gain firsthand information, 
regular and timely reporting of agric activities 
and data to STARS, provides technical and 
credit advisory services to farmers, coordinates 
and organizes FAC. He/she works closely with 
the traditional rulers (who must recognize 
him/her), DPOs, EAs and FAC on loan recovery 
from farmers and other issues.  
S
L
I
F 
 
B
L
I
F 
C
L
I
F 
F
L
I
F 
SLIF=>State Level Institutional Framework; BLIF=>Bank Level Institutional Framework; CLIF=>Community Level Institutional 
Framework; FLIF=>FAC Level Institutional Framework; FMARD => Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; SMARD => 
State Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. 
 
